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DON’T WHISTLE WHILE YOU WORK—UNLESS YOU
WHISTLE TO THE SEC
Christina Pellino*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 2008, four events pushed the U.S. financial system
to the verge of collapse: (1) the federal government took control over
home mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;1 (2) wealth
management company Merrill Lynch agreed to sell itself to Bank of
America for a fraction of its stock trading price when its liquidity
dissolved in a single day;2 (3) global financial services firm Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy;3 and (4) multinational insurance
corporation, American International Group (AIG), faced collapse,
prompting the federal government to loan the insurance giant eightyfive billion dollars.4 At the close of 2008, Wall Street finished its worst
year since the 1930s, and the housing market finished its worst year in
recorded history.5 It took huge taxpayer-financed bail outs to repair
the American market.6 Despite efforts to stop the turmoil, the 2008
*J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude,
2012, Northeastern University. I would like to thank Professor Stephen J. Lubben for
his help and valuable guidance, as well as my classmates on the Seton Hall Law Review
for their editing assistance.
1
David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:28 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/.
2
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15,
2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122142278543033525.html.
3
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4
Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/
17insure.html?pagewanted=all.
5
MARK ZANDI, FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO RECOVERY 7 (2012) (discussing how,
collectively, “a string of financial policy errors beginning with the government takeover
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the collective decision of the Bush
Administration and the Federal Reserve to allow Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt . . .
turned a serious yet manageable financial crisis into an out-of-control financial panic”
and leading to “the worst economic global downturn since the 1930’s Great
Depression”).
6
The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013),
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crisis resulted in the largest depression this country has seen since the
stock market crash of 1929, and today we are still feeling the effects of
the 2008 recession.7
In response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank,” “Dodd-Frank Act,” or “the Act”) on July 21, 2010.8 The goals
of the Act, as summarized in the preamble, are “[t]o promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”9
One specific goal of Dodd-Frank is to encourage whistleblowers
to report securities law violations.10 The Act provides monetary awards
to incentivize employees to report violations and protects employees
who do come forward by shielding them from any employer retaliation
that may arise in response to their whistleblowing.11 It is not clear,
however, who qualifies as a whistleblower under the statute, leaving
potential tipsters uncertain of whether or not they will be eligible for
Dodd-Frank’s protection from employer retaliation if they choose to
report a violation. The ambiguity stems from two conflicting
provisions: the “Definitions” section of the Act, which specifically
defines a whistleblower as an individual who reports a violation directly
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the
Commission”);12 and the “Protection of Whistleblowers” provision (the
“Anti-Retaliation provision”), which prohibits employer retaliation
against “whistleblowers” that report either internally or to an agency
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-arestill-being-felt-five-years-article (“September 2008 almost brought down the world’s
financial system. It took huge taxpayer-financed bail-outs to shore up the industry.”).
7
See, e.g., Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 11 (2009) (“[T]he global economic slowdown
is not like the most recent slowdowns seen in 2001, 1998, or 1987, but is, rather, quite
comparable to the period after the debilitating 1929 stock market crash known as the
Great Depression.”).
8
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15,
22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
9
Preamble, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
10
Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions,
6 BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011) (“Dodd-Frank is designed to incentivize whistleblowers to
expose securities fraud.”).
11
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2015).
12
§ 78u-6(a)(6) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”).
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other than the SEC.13 The clashing provisions leave employers,
potential whistleblowers, and courts with the unresolved question:
does Dodd-Frank require employees to report directly to the SEC
before they are eligible for whistleblower protection under the Act, or
will internal reporting suffice?
Several courts have considered this issue, and their rulings fall on
both sides of the debate.14 To further complicate matters, the SEC has
expressed its own opinion through regulation and amicus briefs that
an employee who raises complaints of potential violations internally,
perhaps to a supervisor or compliance department, falls within the
Act’s whistleblower protection.15 Yet the SEC’s guidance has proven
ineffective and, arguably, has only further complicated the matter.
Several jurisdictions declined to follow the SEC’s broad interpretation
and even questioned the SEC’s authority to regulate on the issue,16
leaving potential whistleblowers in these jurisdictions with conflicting
advice about their protection under Dodd-Frank.
It is imperative to Dodd-Frank’s success that either the courts or
legislature clarify which employees are eligible for whistleblower antiretaliation protections under the Act. Raising a complaint exposes the
reporting employee to various personal and professional risks.
Generally, there are two unfavorable consequences that deter
employees from reporting violations. The first is the risk of social
pressures from colleagues who consider whistleblowers “snitches.”17
Second is the risk of employer backlash, such as being passed over for
a promotion, being demoted, or even being terminated.18 These risks
stem from the fact that employers and employees are in an unequal
power relationship, and “most employers move to isolate, humiliate
and terminate any employee who questions the legality of their . . .
13

§ 78u-6(h)(1).
Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protection provision, only protects those individuals “who provide
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC”), with Rosenblum
v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that an individual reporting securities laws violations internally will fall under
the whistle-blower protections of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)).
15
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2013); see also Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Appellant, Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, No. 13 Civ. 317 (WHP), 2013
WL 5692504 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/
liu-siemens-0214.pdf [hereinafter SEC, Amicus Brief].
16
See infra Part III.C.
17
Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that
Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. MGT. STUD. 1453, 1454 (2003).
18
Id.
14
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practices.”19 An incident experienced by Patrick Burns, Co-Director of
the non-profit organization Taxpayers Against Fraud, adequately
summarizes employer sentiment towards whistleblowers: “I once asked
a room full of compliance officers if their company had ever made an
internal whistleblower ‘employee of the month’ or given them a raise.
The room burst out laughing.”20
Without assurance that Dodd-Frank will protect tipsters from
employer retaliation, it is doubtful that employees will risk their jobs
and reputations by raising complaints. “Most potential internal
whistleblowers, including executive-level ones, will not jeopardize their
careers without an absolute guarantee of anonymity . . . .”21 An
assurance of anonymity and Dodd-Frank’s strong anti-retaliation
protections, however, can ameliorate many of the social and
professional risks associated with reporting and encourage tipsters to
come forward.22
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of pre-Dodd-Frank
whistleblower laws and discusses the importance of whistleblowers in
maintaining corporate integrity. Part III analyzes Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower provision and discusses how previous whistleblower law
shaped the provision. Part IV provides a summary of the conflicting
interpretations of the Anti-Retaliation statute, and Part V discusses how
the statute’s ambiguity can be resolved by using the Chevron test to
ultimately defer to the SEC’s regulations. Part VI concludes.
II. WHISTLEBLOWER LAW BEFORE DODD-FRANK
Whistleblowing occurs when an employee discloses wrongdoing
on the part of his corporation or organization.23 Whistleblowing may
occur internally, when an employee contacts a manager or a
supervisor, or externally, when an employee reports such behavior to
a government agency or media representative.24 As employees within
the company that they report, whistleblowers possess knowledge that
shareholders and the public would otherwise not uncover and are
therefore crucial to detecting corporate fraud. According to a 2010
19

Nicholas Feeney & Patrick Burns, Three Whistleblower Stories, TAXPAYERS AGAINST
FRAUD EDUC. FUND (July 24, 2012), https://www.taf.org/blog/three-whistleblowerstories.
20
FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND
PROTECTION STRATEGIES 1 (2011).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A
Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004).
24
Id.
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study conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
(ACFE), “[whistleblower] tips account for more than 40 percent of
reported instances of occupational fraud.”25 The ACFE’s 2010 study
also concludes that tips are “more effective in detecting occupational
fraud than the collective total of management review, internal audit
and external audit.”26 Absent reporting by internal whistleblowers,
“future incidents of massive corporate wrongdoing, along the lines of
the Enron scandal or the Bernard Madoff ponzi scheme might never
be revealed, or might have been revealed too late.”27
The federal government has long recognized the value of a
whistleblower’s unique position and his power to maintain corporate
integrity,28 and has continuously tried to incentivize whistleblowers to
come forward through monetary awards and retaliation protections for
reporting information to government agencies.29 Despite these efforts,
very few whistleblowers had come forward to report violations,30
perhaps due to the negative treatment whistleblowers tend to face after
raising claims.31 Further, even if a whistleblower leaves his company,
the negative reputation attached to the whistleblower label follows and
may hurt the employee’s chances of securing another job.32
While our society still attaches many negative stigmas to
whistleblowers, several recent corporate scandals have instigated a shift
25

LIPMAN, supra note 20, at 2.
Id. According to a 2010 study, employee tips are the leading method of
detecting securities laws violations, accounting for 40.2% of all cases. Id. The second
most effective of detecting securities laws violations is management review, only
accounting for 15.4% of all cases. Id.
27
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 637, 668 (2010).
28
Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2007). The origins of
whistleblowing legislation in the United States can be traced to the False Claims Act,
enacted in 1863 to reduce the incidences of fraud among the suppliers of munitions
and other war materials to the Union government during the Civil War. Id.; see also
Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 436 (2012) (“Congress has demonstrated its belief that
employees and other insiders are in a unique position to uncover fraud . . . .”).
29
Desai, supra note 28, at 440.
30
Id. at 437.
31
Id. at 437 (“Employee complaints are often diluted or dismissed by
management, and after a claim has been made, many employees are subjected to
various forms of retaliation,” such as workplace harassment or termination.). See
generally Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform
the Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 249
(2009).
32
Kim, supra note 31.
26
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in perspective towards acceptance of and even praise for
whistleblowers33: “whistleblowing as a means to police corporate
misconduct is gaining support.”34 Public disdain for whistleblowers
undoubtedly hindered any past whistleblower incentive programs.
Perhaps this shift in perspective will allow Dodd-Frank to succeed
where its predecessors did not.
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934
Act”) to regulate the secondary securities markets in response to the
infamous stock market crash of 1929.35 The 1934 Act created the SEC,
a federal administrative agency formed to oversee these markets.36
Prior to Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the 1934 Act, the SEC could
reward only whistleblowers involved in insider-trading cases. The SEC
has discretion to award whistleblowers a percentage of the amount
recovered from violators of the Act. That recovery amount, however,
maxes out at ten percent of the total penalty imposed on the violator,
and many whistleblowers receive significantly less than ten percent of
the penalty amount, if they receive any reward at all.37 The SEC retains
unrestricted discretion in determining whether or not to grant a
reward, and many whistleblowers do not receive any money for their
reports.38
Unsurprisingly, the “relatively small financial reward combined
with the discretionary authority of the SEC to reward the
whistleblower” has rendered the 1934 Act an ineffective means of
uncovering insider-trading or other securities violations.39 Since the
statute has been in effect, only five whistleblowers have received

33

Macey, supra note 28, at 1901–02 (attributing the newfound praise for
whistleblowers to the Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom scandals, and even to movies
like The Insider).
34
Peter J. Henning, Tattletales Embraced as Whistle-Blower Program Gain Support, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK, (Dec. 1, 2014, 9:38 AM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/12/01/tattletales-embraced-as-whistle-blower-programs-gain-support/?
module=BlogPost-Title.
35
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2015)).
36
15 U.S.C. § 78(d).
37
§ 78u-6.
38
Sarah Johnson, Paid to Whistle, CFO (July 23, 2010), http://ww2.cfo.com/riskcompliance/2010/07/paid-to-whistle/.
39
Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of ‘Greedy,’ the Eighth Dwarf,
62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2011).
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awards, and those awards totaled a mere $159,537.40
B. The False Claims Act
In 1986, Congress drastically changed the structure of
whistleblower law by expanding the scope of the False Claims Act
(FCA) to prevent the false submission of claims for the payment of
government contracts.41 The FCA allows a private individual, with
knowledge of past or present fraud committed on the federal
government, to sue on the government’s behalf and recover a portion
of any damage award.42 Awards for whistleblowers under the FCA are
mandatory and range from fifteen to thirty percent of any money that
the government receives from the violator.43
The 1986 amendment radically increased FCA compliance and
enforcement.44 Prior to the 1986 amendment, less than ten percent of
FCA claims were initiated by whistleblowers.45 By 2011, however,
eighty-five percent of the FCA claims investigated by the government
or prosecuted were initiated by whistleblowers. In that year alone, the
government reclaimed more than $3 billion, with roughly $530 million
of that amount going to the whistleblowers that instigated these
actions.46
The success of the FCA underscores how crucial whistleblowers
are in uncovering corporate fraud and illegal business practices. It also
highlights that money talks, and if the government wants
whistleblowers to come forward, it will need to incentivize them with
offers of a substantial percentage of the recovery. Although the FCA
improved previous whistleblower law with the promise of stronger
rewards, the FCA lacks a whistleblower protection provision and leaves
tipsters vulnerable to any employer retaliation that may occur as a
result of whistleblowing.

40

Johnson, supra note 38.
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2015)).
42
31 U.S.C. § 3729–33.
43
§ 3730(d)(1); see generally Robert R. Stauffer & Andrew D. Kennedy, Dodd-Frank
Act Promises Large Bounties for Whistleblowers, LAW.COM, Aug. 23, 2010, at 1,
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/270/original/Law.comDoddFrankA
rticle.pdf?1318891008.
44
Stauffer & Kennedy, supra note 43.
45
Age Of The Whistleblower: Incentives And Protections, LAW360 (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://www.law360.com/articles/375370/age-of-the-whistleblower-incentives-andprotections.
46
Id.
41
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C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
following several corporate scandals, such as Enron and Worldcom, in
which numerous multinational corporations became victims of
corporate fraud. These corporate scandals ultimately cost investors
billions of dollars, sending many of these investors and corporations
into insolvency.47 SOX expanded upon previous whistleblower laws by
expressly protecting whistleblowers from employer retaliation, a
feature lacking in previous whistleblower statutes. Unlike the 1934 Act
and FCA, SOX protects whistleblowers from employer retaliation after
reporting violations and also extends whistleblower protection beyond
federal employees to employees of publicly held companies.48
The relevant provisions within SOX addressing whistleblower
protection are Section 301 and Section 806. Section 301 creates an
employee reporting system designed to catch instances of corporate
fraud.49 Section 806 imposes both civil and criminal liability on
companies that take retaliatory actions against whistleblowers and
entitles these whistleblowers to reinstatement or some other form of
recourse.50 Section 806 also penalizes corporations that fail to address
fraud and/or punish the whistleblower that exposed the violations.51
Unfortunately, SOX has not been as successful as expected in
bringing tipsters forward with reports of violations.
SOX’s
whistleblower protections have a number of loopholes, and its shield
has been characterized as “narrow in scope and more illusory than
real.”52 In fact, “after SOX was introduced, the percentage of
whistleblowers . . . actually dropped from 18.4% to 13.2%.”53 The
statute is procedurally complex and provides no punitive damages in
civil actions by whistleblowers, meaning that a terminated
whistleblower’s only likely victory would be an award of back pay and
attorney’s fees.54 The turnaround between witnessing the violation and
47

Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (2012))
48
Hartmann, supra note 39, at 1285–86.
49
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4).
50
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), (c) (2012).
51
Id.
52
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Article, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform
Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 73,
83 (2012) (quoting Deborah L. Seifert et al., The Influence of Organizational Justice on
Accountant Whistleblowing, 35 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC. 707, 709 (2010)).
53
Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 113
MICH. L. REV. 121, 128 (2014).
54
Id. at 129.

PELLINO (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/17/2016 12:48 PM

COMMENT

919

reporting the violation must also be quick, as SOX restricts tipsters to
a ninety-day statute of limitations from the date of the violation.
Further, there is no right to a jury trial under SOX for those
whistleblowers bringing claims in federal court.55
III. CURRENT WHISTLEBLOWER LAW UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act adds a new section to the
1934 Act,56 which expands previous whistleblower laws in two ways: (1)
it increases whistleblowers’ financial incentive to report by requiring
the SEC to award bounties to persons who provide useful information
to the SEC regarding securities law violations;57 and (2) it strengthens
retaliation protections for whistleblowers who provide such
information.58 In passing the Act, Congress sought to encourage
employees to report information related to potential violations of the
securities laws to the Commission.59
The bounty program under Dodd-Frank is a major improvement
from SOX.60 While SOX improved whistleblower protection from
employer retaliation, there was no “financial incentive for
whistleblowers or informants.”61 SOX “screams out for a bounty
program,” given its “exceedingly weak” anti-retaliation provision, the
massive potential for fraud not likely to otherwise be detected by
regulators, and the ability to tie the value of a bounty to the level of
fraud revealed by a whistleblower.62 The payment of a bounty is
mandatory under Dodd-Frank. That Act stipulates that the SEC “shall
pay an award” of ten to thirty percent of the collected monetary
sanctions resulting from “successful enforcement” actions.63 The SEC
has discretion to determine the amount of the award, although the law
provides some guidance, urging the SEC to consider factors such as
the significance of the information provided, the degree of assistance

55

Rapp, supra note 52.
NORRIS MCLAUGHLIN & MARCUS, P.A., NEW WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND
PROTECTION IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT 2 (2010), http://www.nmmlaw.com/pdf/
Whistleblower%20Dodd%20Frank%20Act.pdf.
57
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012).
58
§ 78u-6(h).
59
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010).
60
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h).
61
M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Deja Vu All Over Again:” Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage
Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 460 (2010).
62
Rapp, supra note 52, at 85 (quoting Jarod Spencer Gonzalez, A Pot of Gold at the
End of the Rainbow: An Economic Incentives-Based Approach to OSHA Whistleblowing, 14 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 325, 346 (2010)).
63
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
56
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the whistleblower provides, and the “programmatic interest” of the
SEC in “deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to
whistleblowers.”64
Dodd-Frank expands SOX in several other respects as well, such
as increasing the statute of limitations period for reporting violations.
Under Dodd-Frank, tipsters who are discriminated against or fired in
response to their whistleblowing have a six-year statute of limitations
to bring their case to a federal judge, and the limitations period begins
with “the date on which the employee became aware of the violation”65
rather than the date the violation occurred.66 Dodd-Frank also
expands protection to employees in private subsidiaries and affiliates
of public companies and gives SOX whistleblowers an express right to
a jury trial in retaliation cases.67
A. Who is a Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank?
Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower under the Act as “any
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”68 At first glance, this definition suggests that a
whistleblower must report violations directly to the SEC in order for
Dodd-Frank to shield him from employer retaliation. A protected
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank is one who reports securities laws
violations “to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”69 This provision, however, cannot be
fully understood without considering subsection (iii) of 15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(h)(1)(A), Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision, which
specifies the ways in which the Act protects whistleblowers from their
employers. The Act provides:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten,
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2012).
See Leifer, supra note 53, at 129.
Rapp, supra note 52, at 73.
15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).
Id. (emphasis added).
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(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
Commission based upon or related to such information;
or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . ,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . , including
section 10A(m) of such Act . . . , and any other law, rule,
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.70
Subsections (i) and (ii) undoubtedly protect whistleblowers who
report potentially illegal activity to the SEC, or employees that work
with the SEC, in some manner, concerning potential securities
violations. The confusion over who qualifies as a whistleblower under
Dodd-Frank stems from subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation
provision. This subsection indicates that a whistleblower reporting
securities violations internally, and not to the SEC, still falls within the
scope of Dodd-Frank as long as he would otherwise be protected under
SOX, the 1934 Act, or any other law, rule, or regulation within the
SEC’s jurisdiction.
Subsection (iii) seems inconsistent with the definition of a
whistleblower because many laws, rules and regulations within the
SEC’s jurisdiction do not require any interaction with the SEC
whatsoever.71 SOX, for example, affords whistleblower protection to
an employee who gives “information or assistance” to “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee.”72 Hypothetically, if an
employee reports activity violating SOX to a supervisor and does not
contact the SEC, Dodd-Frank would protect that whistleblower from
employer harassment or retaliation. If, under the Act, a whistleblower
is strictly an individual who reports a violation to the SEC, why also
include protections for employees that report either internally or to
other agencies?

70
71
72

§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
Rapp, supra note 52, at 74.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1), (1)(C) (2012).
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B. The SEC’s Interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision
Recognizing the potential conflict, the SEC attempted to settle
the issue through regulation. The SEC argues that its Rule 21F-2(b)(1)
reasonably resolves this tension because it “ensur[es] that individuals
who report internally first will not be potentially disadvantaged by
losing employment anti-retaliation protection.”73
In its final
regulations adopted on May 25, 2011, the SEC took the position that a
whistleblower need not make a disclosure to the SEC to be protected
under Dodd-Frank.74 The regulations, in relevant part, provide that:
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded
by . . . 78u-6(h)(1), you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information
you are providing relates to a possible securities law
violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about
to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described
in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
78u-6(h)(1)(A)).75
The SEC regulations, however, have not resolved the issue. If
anything, the regulations have further confused the matter by
introducing the new question: does the SEC have the authority to
define “whistleblower” in the context of Dodd-Frank?76
In February 2014, the SEC filed an amicus brief with the Second
Circuit in Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens, encouraging the court to rule on the
scope of whistleblower protection and to adopt the SEC’s rule-making
authority.77 In Meng-Lin Liu, the plaintiff, a Taiwanese resident and
compliance officer for Siemens China, was terminated shortly after
internally reporting concerns about an alleged kickback scheme in the
company’s healthcare division.78 Liu filed suit in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York, claiming protection as a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision and
arguing that the Anti-Retaliation provision does not explicitly require
external reporting to the SEC.79

73

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2013).
Id.
75
Id.
76
Henning, supra note 34. Under Chevron, courts should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The SEC’s interpretation should
prevail if the statute is unclear. Id.
77
SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 39.
78
Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
79
Id.
74
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In its amicus brief, the SEC argued that the statutory language of
Dodd-Frank does not unambiguously indicate whether individuals
must report directly to the SEC to come within the Act’s
protection.80 As long as there is ambiguity in the statute, the SEC
argued, it is permissible for the SEC to adopt a reasonable
interpretation. The SEC also maintained that its interpretation of
Dodd-Frank is consistent with congressional policy to encourage, and
in some instances require, internal reporting of potential misconduct
under federal securities laws, especially SOX. Finally, the SEC urged
that the narrow interpretation, if adopted, “would significantly weaken
the deterrence effect on employers who might otherwise consider
taking an adverse employment action.”81 The court ultimately
dismissed the case based on unrelated deficiencies in the plaintiff’s
claim and skirted the issue of whether or not internal whistleblowers
are protected under Dodd-Frank.82
In December 2014, the SEC filed a second amicus brief with the
Third Circuit in support of the plaintiff in Safarian v. American DG
Energy Inc.,83 reiterating its argument that the statute is ambiguous and
urging the court to endorse the agency’s definition of “whistleblower”
as including individuals who only report internally. The SEC again
argued that the protection afforded by clause (iii) “reaches beyond just
disclosures involving securities law violations and disclosures to the
Commission.”84
C. Case Law Interpreting Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision
Several district courts have acknowledged the conflict between
the plain terms of the Dodd-Frank Act’s definition of
“whistleblower”—one
who
provides
information
“to
the
Commission”—and the Anti-Retaliation provision, which protects an
individual who makes disclosures “required or protected” under any
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
The cases decided thus far fall on one of two sides: either
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank are only those individuals who
80

SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 12.
Id. at 30.
82
Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
83
No. CIV. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, remanded, 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015).
84
Brief for SEC as Amici Curiae in Support of the Appellant, at 29, Safarian v. Am.
DG Energy Inc., No. CIV. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, remanded, 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/safarian-americandg.pdf
[hereinafter
SEC, Amicus Brief II].
81
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report directly to the SEC and Dodd-Frank’s protection does not
extend to employees who report violations internally; or Dodd-Frank
should be interpreted broadly to encompass whistleblowers who report
violations internally.85 Of the courts that have considered the issue, an
overwhelming majority side with the SEC and interpret the statute
broadly to protect both external and internal whistleblowers.86 Not all
of these courts, however, reach this conclusion in the same manner; a
number of courts used the basic tools of statutory construction while
others simply deferred to the SEC’s interpretation.87
i.

A Majority of Courts Agree That the Statute is
Ambiguous and Defer to the SEC’s Reasonable
Interpretation Using the Chevron Test

Many courts considering the issue find the text of Dodd-Frank to
be ambiguous with regard to its whistleblower definition and defer to
the SEC. The Southern District of New York, for instance, ruled
in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters LLC that the whistleblower
requirements are ambiguous under Dodd-Frank, and the court should
thus respect the SEC’s determination that reporting to the SEC is not
required in order for an individual to qualify as a whistleblower.88
The plaintiff in Rosenblum who sold financial products for
Thomson Reuters, witnessed a company practice that violated insidertrading rules. Rosenblum reported the illegal behavior to two
Thomson Reuters supervisors.89 The two supervisors dismissed his
concern, prompting Rosenblum to contact both the Federal Bureau of

85

See Mystica M. Alexander, Defining the Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank: Who
L.
REV.
CIRCUIT
278,
281–82
(2014),
Decides?,
5
CALIF.
http://www.californialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/ALEXANDER_27
8.pdf.
86
Id. at 281.
87
Compare Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 729–30 (D. Neb.
2014) (independently adopting SEC’s view based on statutory language of the Act),
Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the
Chevron test and ultimately deferring to SEC’s regulation to hold that internal
reporting is protected conduct), Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining to follow Asadi and finding ambiguity
in the conflict between Definitions section and Anti-Retaliation provision), and
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (“This court
respectfully disagrees and instead adopts the SEC’s interpretation of the relevant
provisions of Dodd-Frank.”), with Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620,
623 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plain language of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower
protection provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who provide
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to SEC).
88
Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48.
89
Id. at 144.
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Investigation and the Thomson Reuters Ethics Committee. Shortly
after these events, Thomson Reuters fired Rosenblum. Rosenblum
brought a claim against Thomson Reuters, alleging protection from
retaliation under the whistleblower protection provision of DoddFrank. Defendants challenged Rosenblum’s whistleblower status,
arguing that because Rosenblum had failed to report information
directly to the SEC, he did not qualify under the Dodd-Frank definition
of a whistleblower.90
The court determined that the statute was ambiguous and applied
the two-part test established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.91 The Chevron test, as the court explained, requires
the following:
The first step inquires whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. However, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court applies
step two—whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. If the agency
interpretation is reasonable, then [a court] must defer to it.92
Applying the two-step test, the court acknowledged that “the governing
statute is ambiguous” and found it “appropriate to consider the SEC’s
interpretation of the statute.”93
Several months later, the District Court of New Jersey also
deferred to the SEC’s definition of a whistleblower. In Khazin v. TD
Ameritrade Holding Corp., the plaintiff was terminated after reporting
improper pricing of certain financial products to his supervisor,
prompting him to bring a claim under the whistleblower protection
provision of Dodd-Frank.94 The Court applied the Chevron test,
reasoning: “if the statute is ambiguous and the Congressional intent
underlying the statute is unclear, courts look to the agency’s
construction of the statute for guidance.”95 The court noted the
obvious conflict and ambiguity in the statute and deferred to the SEC’s

90

Id. at 148.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
92
See Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
93
Id. at 147–48.
94
Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), 2014 WL
940703, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014).
95
Id. at *4.
91
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interpretation.96
In September 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, reversed the decision of the district court
below and held that “the [whistleblower] provisions of Dodd-Frank
create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant our deference to the SEC’s
interpretive rule.”97 In Berman, the plaintiff alleged that he reported to
his employer, but not to the SEC, a number of transactions that he
reasonably believed to be violations of “policy, law, and GAAP,” “WPP
policies,” and “Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and U.S. Securities
Laws.”98 Plaintiff also claimed that his employer fired him after raising
complaints in violation of Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision for
whistleblowers.99 The Southern District of New York declined to follow
the prior case law of its own jurisdiction and instead followed the
minority position outlined in Asadi, concluding that the employee was
not a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank.100
The split within the district itself was, however, short-lived. On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision below and held that
the definition of a whistleblower is ambiguous under the statute, thus
it was appropriate to defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation using
the Chevron test.101 In so holding, the court was not persuaded by the
argument that reading the text in a way to protect internal
whistleblowers would render certain parts of the statute “superfluous;”
instead, the court noted that the additional language was just one of
the “realities of the legislative process.”102 Pointing out that the AntiRetaliation provisions were “added at the last minute,” the court
reasoned: “it is not at all surprising that no one noticed that the new
subdivision and the definition of ‘whistleblower’ do not fit together
neatly.”103 Further, the court reasoned that it “need not definitively
construe the statute, because . . . the tension between the
96

Id. at *6.
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015).
98
Id. at 149.
99
Id.
100
Id. The district court below reasoned that “[a]pplying the standard canons of
statutory construction, one would expect that the defined term would have the same
meaning in the anti-retaliation provisions of the Act as it does elsewhere in the statute.”
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d and
remanded, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court further reasoned that this
reading makes sense in the context of the financial bounty provisions of the Act,
noting, “it is hard to imagine how the Commission would pay a financial award to a
whistleblower who never reported information to the Commission.” Id.
101
Berman, 801 F.3d at 154–55.
102
Id. at 154.
103
Id. at 154–55.
97
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definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the limited protection provided
by subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) . . . [is] sufficiently
ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the reasonable
interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute.”104
ii.

Other Courts Find That the Text of Dodd-Frank
Unambiguously Supports a Definition of
Whistleblower That Includes Internal Reporting

Other courts have relied solely on the text of Dodd-Frank to hold
that a whistleblower does not need to report to the SEC under the Act
by carving out a narrow exception to the definition of whistleblower
specifically for the Anti-Retaliation provision.105 In Ellington v.
Giacoumakis, the plaintiff brought suit against his former employer,
defendant New England Investment & Retirement Group, Inc.
(NEINV), alleging a termination of his employment in violation of the
whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act after he reported
securities laws violations to a NEINV compliance officer.106 Plaintiff
argued that his disclosures were protected under the whistleblower
provisions of the SOX, which, by extension, are incorporated into the
protections afforded to whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.107
Ultimately, the court held for the plaintiff, analyzing the text of
the statute to reach its conclusion. The court reasoned that it is
“apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i)
that Congress intended that an employee terminated for reporting
Sarbanes-Oxley violations to a supervisor or an outside compliance
officer, and ultimately to the SEC, have a private right of action under
Dodd-Frank whether or not [the employee reports the violation to the
SEC].”108
In Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, the Southern District of New York
evaluated the two interpretations of the Act and concluded that
although both were permissible, neither was mandatory.109 The court

104

Id. at 155.
See, e.g., Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best
harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain
whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception
to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the
SEC.”).
106
Ellington v. Giacomakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (D. Mass. 2013).
107
Id.
108
See id. at 45.
109
Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *3–4
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
105
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also used the “existence of these ‘competing, plausible interpretations’
of the statutory provisions as clear evidence that ‘the statutory text is
ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.’”110 The court considered
multiple factors in reaching its conclusion: the trend in recent case
law; the basic tools of statutory construction; and the SEC’s
promulgated rules. The court reasoned that “the SEC’s rule clarifies
an ambiguous statutory scheme . . . and reflects the considerable
experience and expertise that the agency has acquired over time with
respect to interpretation and enforcement of the securities laws,” and
ultimately sided with the broad interpretation of a whistleblower as also
including employees that raise violations internally to a supervisor.111
In Bussing v. COR Clearing LLC, the District Court for the District
of Nebraska held that a whistleblower who reported violations to the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)112 was protected
under Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision.113 Bussing brought suit
against her former employer, Legent Clearing (now COR Clearing),
after being fired for preparing a report, in response to a document
request from FINRA, that alleged Legent violated the Bank Secrecy Act
and anti-money laundering provisions.114 The court held that the
plaintiff’s disclosures to FINRA qualified as a disclosure subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC and therefore entitled plaintiff to protection
under subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation provision.115 The court
refused to apply the definition of “whistleblower” found in 5 U.S.C.
§78u-6(a)(6) to the Anti-Retaliation provision, reasoning that a strict
reading of the text would undermine Dodd-Frank’s overall purpose.116
The court argued:
When it is apparent that Congress intended a word to be
given its ordinary meaning, notwithstanding the presence of
a statutory definition to the contrary, and when applying the
definition to the provision at issue would defeat that
provision’s purpose, the Court will not mechanically read the
statutory definition into that provision.117

110

Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
112
FINRA is a non-governmental entity that acts as a self-regulatory organization
and regulates trading of equities, corporate bonds, securities futures, and options.
113
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 740 (D. Neb. 2014).
114
Id. at 723–25.
115
Id. at 730.
116
Id. (“Nor is it logical to conclude that Congress intended to encourage an
across-the-board departure from the general practice of first making an internal
report.”).
117
Id. at 729.
111
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Rejecting the statutory definition, the court instead used the
everyday definition of a whistleblower as “a person who tells police,
reporters, etc., about something (such as a crime) that has been kept
secret, or an employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a
governmental or law-enforcement agency.”118
Unless the term
“whistleblower” is given its ordinary meaning for purposes of the AntiRetaliation provision, subsection (iii) will be rendered insignificant,
and its purpose—to shield a broad range of employee disclosures—will
be thwarted.119
iii. A Minority of Courts Have Held That the Text of DoddFrank Unambiguously States a Whistleblower Under
the Act is an Individual or Individuals Who Report
Securities Violations to the SEC
Until the recent Second Circuit decision in Berman, the Fifth
Circuit was the only circuit court to rule on the question of whether
the SEC’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference. In July 2013,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no ambiguity in
the Act’s qualifications for a whistleblower and, thus, refused to follow
the SEC’s regulations.120 The court also declined to follow the trend in
several district court decisions that had found internal reports to be
protected.121 The Fifth Circuit issued a decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy
(USA), LLC, holding that, to be a “whistleblower” under the SEC’s
whistleblower program, an employee must provide information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.122
In Asadi, the plaintiff worked for GE Energy’s Iraq Country
Executive. After witnessing practices that he believed violated the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the plaintiff reported the issue
to both of his supervisors, but did not raise any complaints to the
SEC.123 Shortly after his complaint, Asadi received a “surprisingly
negative” performance review, and his supervisors pressured him to
step down from his position. Ultimately, the plaintiff was fired,
prompting him to file suit alleging that GE Energy violated the SEC
whistleblower protections of Dodd-Frank.124 Asadi asserted that he was
118

Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
120
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013).
121
See Catherine Foti, When is A ‘Whistleblower’ Not Really A Whistleblower?, FORBES
(Aug. 7, 2013, 11:22 AM),http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/08/07/
when-is-a-whistleblower-not-really-a-whistleblower/.
122
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
123
Id. at 621.
124
Id.
119
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a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank and argued that the AntiRetaliation section, on its face, did not require disclosure of
information to the SEC.125
The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s claim, ruling that he was
not a “whistleblower” because he did not report a violation of the
securities laws to the SEC.126 The court also held that plaintiff’s internal
reporting of potential FCPA violations did not fall within the AntiRetaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act because he could not
show that his internal disclosures of alleged corrupt actions were
protected or required by the terms of the FCPA.127 The protections the
Anti-Retaliation provision offers, the court explained, extend only to
individuals who meet the external reporting requirements of the
Definitions section; “the latter section merely describes a set of
protected activities for individuals who have already achieved
whistleblower status by reporting to the SEC.”128 The court focused on
the word “whistleblower” in the Anti-Retaliation section and argued
that, had Congress intended this section to provide protections for all
individuals making internal disclosures, it would have used the term
“individual” or “employee” rather than “whistleblower.” Instead of
reading subsection (iii) as expanding the definition of a Dodd-Frank
whistleblower, subsection (iii) merely “expands protection for those
who report both to the SEC and internally.”129
In deciding to follow this narrow definition, the Fifth Circuit also
considered how the broad definition of whistleblower would implicate
SOX if it were controlling law. If all SOX-protected activity fell under
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions, then regardless of whether the
employee provided information to the SEC, all SOX claimants could
arguably file a whistleblower retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank and
circumvent SOX altogether.130 This means that a plaintiff could raise
any SOX issue under Dodd-Frank and take advantage of a longer
statute of limitations, a direct right of action in federal district court,
and nearly double monetary damages. Such a construction would,
according to the Fifth Circuit, render SOX obsolete.131

125

Id. at 624.
Id. at 630.
127
Id.
128
Leifer, supra note 53, at 137 (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626).
129
Alison Frankel, Appeals Court Restricts Dodd-Frank Protection for Whistle-Blowers,
REUTERS (July 18, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/07/18/
appeals-court-restricts-dodd-frank-protection-for-whistle-blowers/.
130
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.
131
Id.
126
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Unfortunately, the courts have only further muddled the question
of who qualifies for Dodd-Frank whistleblower protection. The courts
“are all over the place . . . . Unless you’re in the Fifth Circuit, there’s
no consensus.”132 Yet even the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is not entirely
persuasive and leaves certain aspects of the issue unresolved. Under
Asadi, reporting a securities law violation to the SEC is an absolute
prerequisite to Dodd-Frank protection.133 Subsection (iii), according
to the Asadi reasoning, simply prohibits employers from taking
retaliatory action against a whistleblower for any further reporting.
But this conclusion ignores the bigger picture of Dodd-Frank within
the context of broader securities-law framework, “particularly the
internal reporting processes that Congress has previously
established.”134 Dodd-Frank aims to improve the accountability and
transparency of the financial system. Adopting the broad definition of
a whistleblower avoids “disincentivizing individuals from reporting
internally first in appropriate circumstances.”135 According to a study
by the Ethics Resource Center, eighty-four percent of whistleblowers
attempt to report their concerns internally and only turn to outside
authorities with compliance violations when their internal complaints
go unheeded.136 Companies want their employees to first report
alleged legal violations internally so that they can investigate the
allegation; decide whether there is a violation; and determine whether
they can defend against the allegation, identify any wrongdoers, and
remediate the situation.137 Yet employers may find it difficult to
encourage employees to use the company’s reporting systems if
employees understand that internal whistleblowing is not protected
conduct.

132

Ben James, 5 Questions Weighing on Whistleblower Lawyers in 2015, LAW360 (Jan.
13, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607911/5-questions-weighingon-whistleblower-lawyers-in-2015 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
134
The 1995 amendment to the 1934 Act, imposing a series of internal company
disclosure obligations on registered public accounting firms, coupled with the 2002
enactment of SOX, imposing additional requirements for internal company reporting
of wrongdoing, underscore Congress’ intent to increase corporate transparency. SEC,
Amicus Brief II, supra note 84, at 33.
135
SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 28 (citing Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70500 (Nov. 17, 2010)).
136
Christopher M. Matthews, Most Whistleblowers Report Internally, Study Finds, WSJ
BLOGS
(May
30,
2012,
9:25
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2012/05/30/most-whistleblowers-report-internally-study-finds/.
137
Id.
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In support of the narrow definition of a whistleblower, the Asadi
court argued that the broad interpretation would make SOX
irrelevant. The court reasoned that the broad interpretation would
render a private cause of action under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806,
“for practical purposes, moot.”138 But this statement ignores the
advantages of bringing a SOX claim over a Dodd-Frank claim in certain
situations. First, a SOX claim is more suitable for a plaintiff seeking to
avoid litigation costs and to stay out of courtrooms. SOX claims, unlike
claims brought under Dodd-Frank, are heard in an administrative
forum at the Department of Labor (DOL). DOL also “assumes
responsibility for investigating the retaliation claim and preparing the
evidence for an administrative law judge’s review.”139 Under certain
circumstances, SOX can also provide for a greater financial reward
than a claim under Dodd-Frank. Unlike Dodd-Frank, SOX provides
for “all relief necessary to make the employee whole” and for
“compensation for any special damages.”140 This language has been
held to authorize compensation for emotional distress and
reputational harm.141 This option will be best for individuals who have
suffered significant emotional harm.
Asadi also held that the broad interpretation of “whistleblower”
would render the words “to the Commission” in the Definitions section
superfluous.142 The same argument, however, can be flipped to argue
that the words “to the Commission” in (ii) and (iii) are superfluous if
the narrow interpretation is adopted. If a whistleblower is, by
definition, already an individual who reports to the SEC, why repeat
“to the Commission” in (ii) and (iii)? “Surely Congress could have
been more explicit and more direct if it in fact intended to protect only
those disclosures that involve securities law violations, and only if the
employee has made a separate disclosure to the Commission.”143

138

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.
SEC, Amicus Brief II, supra note 84.
140
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) & (c)(2)(C) (2012).
141
See e.g., Rutherford v. Jones Lang Lasalle Am., Inc., No. 12-14422, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116872, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that ”the language of SOX’s
remedy provision, analogous whistleblower statutes and decisions of the ARB support
the recovery of damages under SOX for emotional distress, mental anguish,
humiliation and injury to reputation”).
142
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.
143
SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 21.
139
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IV. COURTS CAN USE THE CHEVRON TEST TO RESOLVE DODD-FRANK’S
AMBIGUOUS WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION
Candidly, there are strong arguments for both the narrow and the
broad interpretation of the word “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank.
Perhaps this is why courts have held for both sides of the issue. The
ambiguity lies in the fact that both definitions, narrow and broad, are
supported by the text of the statute.144 On the one hand, the AntiRetaliation provision, when read as a catch-all after carving out an
exception to the definition of “whistleblower” in 78u-6(a), protects
internal disclosures and other tips to agencies other than the SEC.
Conversely, the Anti-Retaliation provision, when interpreted as a
simple list of whistleblower protections (e.g., an individual has already
reported a securities law violation to the SEC) raises the question of
“why Congress [would] craft clause (iii) to [unnecessarily] suggest that
it protects a much broader class of disclosures than it actually does?”145
V. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE CHEVRON TEST AND DEFER TO THE
SEC’S INTERPRETATION
Chevron holds that an ambiguous statute can be clarified with a
two-part test to determine regulatory authority.146 First, the court must
determine whether Congress has spoken directly on the question at
issue. If so, then the court defers to the statute.147 If Congress has not
addressed the issue in the statute itself, then the court must determine
whether the agency’s response to the statute is based on a “permissible”
interpretation of the statute and defer to the agency.148 In defining
“whistleblower,” Congress delegates power to the SEC as the
rulemaking agency: “[t]he term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide,
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”149 Thus, the statute grants the SEC power to issue
144

Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *13–14
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
145
SEC, Amicus Brief II, supra note 84, at 20.
146
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
147
If Congress has spoken directly on the issue, “the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43.
148
Id. at 843.
“Permissible” encompasses any interpretation that is not
unreasonable. Essentially, courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless that
interpretation is irrational. See Orrin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998)
(internal citations omitted).
149
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2015) (emphasis added).
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regulations relating to the manner in which information may be
reported under the Act.150
A. Congress Has Not Spoken Directly to the Issue of Whether a
Whistleblower Must Report a Securities Violation to the SEC
The statute’s text provides little help in determining Congress’
intent behind subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation provision, as it
was not included in the statute until very late in the drafting process.
In fact, the language of subsection (iii) only first appeared in the base
conference committee draft that the Senate, in May 2010, approved
for use in the Dodd-Frank conference committee.151 It was not
included in the bill that passed the House in December 2009, nor in
the version that passed the Senate in May 2010, and there is no hint as
to why the language was added to that draft.152 Furthermore, the
majority of the committee reports and debates in Congress focus on
the bounty provisions of the Act and “contain very few substantive
discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.”153 Of the minimal reports
that discuss the Anti-Retaliation provision, “none touch upon the issue
of whether reporting to the SEC is required for whistleblowers to avail
themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.”154 Analysis of the
legislative history does little more than suggest that Congress was not
aware of any potential conflict when they included subsection (iii).155

150

See id.
The provision first appeared in the base conference committee draft that the
Senate, in May 2010, approved for use in the Dodd-Frank conference committee. See
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(a) (conference base text).
152
This section was not included either in the original version of the bill that
passed the House, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203(a) (as passed Dec. 11, 2009), nor
was it included in the version that initially passed the Senate, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
§ 922(a) (as passed May 20, 2010).
153
See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The legislative history of [Dodd-Frank] provides little
evidence of Congress’s purpose [regarding the Anti-Retaliation provision]. The
various committee reports and debates in Congress focus on the bounty provisions of
the Act and contain very few substantive discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.
Of those few, none touch upon the issue of whether reporting to the SEC is required
for whistleblowers to avail themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.”).
154
Id.
155
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. 2014) (“The
official record contains only fleeting references to the anti-retaliation provision.”).
151
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B. The SEC’s Regulation Clarifying the Statute is a Reasonable
Interpretation for Chevron Purposes
The second prong of the Chevron test is “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”156 The
SEC maintains that its interpretation is reasonable because it: (1)
“effectuates the broad employment anti-retaliation protections that
clause (iii) contemplates”; (2) it “avoid[s] disincentivizing individuals
from reporting internally first in appropriate circumstances”; (3) SEC
experience indicates “that if internal compliance and reporting
procedures ‘are not utilized or working, our system of securities
regulation will be less effective’”; and (4) “it enhances the
Commission’s ability to bring enforcement actions when employers
take adverse employment actions against employees for reporting
securities law violations internally.”157
The SEC’s position, from a public policy standpoint, “is more in
accordance with the overall objective of securities law enforcement,
which is to encourage reporting.”158 As the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce recognizes in its public comments, “internal reporting
mechanisms are cornerstones of effective compliance policies because
they permit companies to discover instances of potential wrongdoing,
to investigate underlying facts and to take remedial action,” in turn
helping to create a strong culture of integrity and deter future
misconduct.159 Reporting internally should always be preferable for a
business organization, as it helps organizations detect fraud from the
inside,160 thereby avoiding substantial future litigation costs or bad
publicity. A whistleblower that reports directly to the SEC “may bypass
internal compliance completely, depriving a company of an
opportunity to investigate and remedy potential wrongdoing before
regulators get involved—and depriving them of the possibility that
regulators might never need to become involved.”161 If internal

156

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
157
SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 28–29 (citing to Proposed Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70500 (Nov. 17, 2010)).
158
Alexander, supra note 85, at 284.
159
Jordan A. Thomas & Vanessa De Simone, Opinion: Employers May Come to Regret
Seeking Narrow Definition of ‘Whistleblower,’ THE NAT’L L J. (Apr. 14, 2014),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1397049044573/Opinion-Employers-MayCome-to-Regret-Seeking-Narrow-Definition-ofWhistleblower?slreturn=20160114214914.
160
Alexander, supra note 85, at 284.
161
Foti, supra note 121.
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reporting is not covered by Dodd-Frank, it encourages reporting to the
government and undermines internal compliance programs, and
could lead to costly and embarrassing regulatory issues. As a result,
“[t]his decreases the effectiveness of compliance programs by
reducing the number of employees willing to utilize internal reporting
mechanisms.”162
The SEC’s rule utilizes corporate compliance departments to
streamline the whistleblowing process and make it more effective. The
number of whistleblower tips is only expected to rise and the entire
process will become more productive if the SEC can share some of the
responsibility with the companies of the reporting employees.163 In
fiscal year 2012, the SEC had only fourteen employees administering a
whistleblower program that generated 3,001 tips and required the
SEC’s staff to return over 3,050 telephone calls.164 Policing and
enforcing securities laws will be more effective if the SEC and
compliance groups can work together.165
The SEC’s rule clarifies the ambiguity over who exactly qualifies
as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower without undermining the goals of the
Act. Until the Supreme Court can rule on the issue, the Chevron test
can be used to defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation.

162

Shannon Kay Quigley, Whistleblower Tug-Of-War: Corporate Attempts to Secure
Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided by the DoddFrank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 269 (2012) (citation omitted).
163
Id. at 272.
164
Foti, supra note 121.
165
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It has been over five years since Congress enacted Dodd-Frank
and we have yet to find a clear understanding of the whistleblower
provision. Courts in the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits have held that Dodd-Frank protects internal
whistleblowers.166 Courts in the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have held the opposite.167 Even more troubling, judges in two
district courts—Colorado and the Northern District of California—
disagree as to whether internal complaints are protected.168 Until
either the courts or legislature clarify which tipsters are eligible for
whistleblower status, Dodd-Frank cannot reach its full potential of
uncovering and reprimanding securities law violators.

166

Michael Filoromo, III, SDNY Widens Split on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protection,
LAW 360 (Dec. 18, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/602937/sdnywidens-split-on-dodd-frank-whistleblower-protection.
167
Id.
168
Id.

